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EVIDENCE OF PROPENSITY AND PROBABILITY IN SEX
OFFENSE CASES AND OTHER CASES
DAVID J. KARP*
My subject today is the admission of evidence of uncharged
crimes against the defendant, with particular reference to the use of
such evidence in sex offense cases.
Public attention has been focused on this issue by the William
Kennedy Smith case in Florida.1 As everyone knows, the case in-
volved a sexual assault prosecution, in which the court excluded evi-
dence that the defendant had engaged in sexual assaults against a
number of other women.
2
However, the proposal for reform in this area pre-dates that par-
ticular case. It initially appeared in February of 1991 in bills intro-
duced by Representative Susan Molinari3 and Senator Robert Dole.4
The bills proposed a general rule of admissibility in sexual assault and
child molestation cases for evidence that the defendant has committed
offenses of the same type on other occasions.5 The same proposal has
subsequently been introduced in a number of other bills. These in-
clude the two violent crime bills that President Bush transmitted to
* Senior Counsel, Office of Policy Development, United States Department of Justice;
B.A. 1972, Columbia College; Ph.D. 1975, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1979, Co-
lumbia University School of Law. This statement and the accompanying Response to Professor
lmwinkelried's Comments, 70 Cm.-KENrr L. REv. 37 (1994), contain the prepared text of an
address presented to the Evidence Section of the Association of American Law Schools
("AALS") on January 9, 1993. The new evidence rules discussed in this address have since been
enacted as FED. R. EvmD. 413-15 by § 320935 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (Sept. 13, 1994). This address provides "a
detailed account of the views of the legislative sponsors and the administration concerning the
... reform, and should ... be considered an authoritative part of its legislative history." 140
CONG. REC. H8991 (statement of principal House sponsor Representative Susan Molinari); see
also 140 CONG. REC. 512,990 (statement of principal Senate sponsor Senator Robert Dole). Be-
cause these statements are part of the legislative history of the enacted rules, they have not been
changed from the text presented to the AALS Evidence Section, except for editing to conform
to the Chicago-Kent Law Review's conventions regarding citation form and footnote documenta-
tion. The bracketed footnotes in this publication were added in the editing process and were not
included in the original text of the address.
[1. State v. Smith, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, # 91-005482 CF A 02.]
[2. See Cathy Booth, The Case That Was Not Heard, TIME, Dec. 23, 1991, at 38; David A.
Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Palm Beach Lessons, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1991, at 30.]
3. H.R. 1149, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 231 (1991).
4. S. 472, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 231 (1991).
[5. Id.]
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the 102d Congress,6 and the proposed "Sexual Assault Prevention Act
of 1992." 7
My discussion of this proposal will be in three parts. First, I will
briefly describe the proposed new rules for sex offense cases and their
intended operation. Second, I will discuss the arguments that have
been made in support of these rules by the legislative sponsors and the
Administration. Third, I will try to relate the proposed reform to
broader issues in the law of evidence.
Before starting, however, I think it would be useful, as a kind of
reality check, to describe two rape cases in which courts excluded evi-
dence of this type under existing rules.
The first case is People v. Sanza,8 from New York state in 1986.
The evidence in that case indicated that Sanza raped and murdered
Theresa Cha when she came to meet her husband in the building
where Sanza worked. Among other evidence, Sanza was in the build-
ing at the right time, and was seen wearing the victim's ring by his
sister within a few hours of the crime.9 On the day after the killing, he
ransacked the apartment where he was staying with his sister, took
over $1,000 in jewelry and other items, and never returned.10 Another
person also saw Sanza wearing the victim's ring, and observed
scratches or a bruise on his arm, which Sanza explained away with a
false story." Blood of the same type as the victim's was found on
Sanza's boots, which he left at his sister's apartment.'2
The police subsequently found Sanza in Florida, where he had
pleaded guilty to three other rapes.' 3 In the prosecution of Sanza for
raping and murdering Theresa Cha, the government offered evidence
6. The original violent crime bill transmitted to Congress by the President [i.e., President
Bush] in March of 1991 was S. 635 and H.R. 1400. The proposal relating to prior crimes evi-
dence in sex offense cases was in § 801 of the bill. See 137 CoNo. REC. S3212 (text) and S3238-42
(analysis statement) (1991). The President [i.e., President Bush] transmitted to Congress on Sep-
tember 30, 1992, a second violent crime bill, the proposed "Violent Crime Control Act of 1992,"
which included substantially the same proposal as § 121 of the proposed "Sexual Assault Preven-
tion Act of 1992," H.R. 5960 and S. 3271.
7. The proposed "Sexual Assault Prevention Act" was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives as H.R. 5960 by Rep. Susan Molinari and Rep. Jon Kyl, and in the Senate as S. 3271 by
Senator Robert Dole and several co-sponsors. The text of the bill appears in 138 CONG. REC.
S15,160-69 (1992); the proposed new evidence rules for sex offense cases are in § 121 of the bill.
This proposal was also introduced by Rep. James Sensenbrenner as a separate bill, H.R. 3463, in
1991.
8. 509 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
[9. Id. at 312-13.]
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of these other rapes. They involved some specific similarities to the
charged offense, including the theft or attempted theft of jewelry in all
instances. 14 The trial court allowed the victims of Sanza's other rapes
to testify concerning those crimes at the trial because the victim of the
charged offense, having been murdered, was unavailable to identify
her assailant.15
The appellate court reversed Sanza's conviction for rape and
murder because of the admission of this evidence.' 6 The court con-
cluded that the evidence of the earlier offenses "demonstrated a pro-
pensity to commit rape" but "proved nothing about our case" because
the similarities to the earlier offenses were "hardly 'unique' or 'un-
common' in rape cases.' 1
7
The second case is People v. Key,' 8 a California case from 1984.
In that case, the evidence indicated that when the victim was driving
home at 2:30 A.M., Key drove next to her and said one of her wheels
was coming off. When she stopped, Key choked her and held a knife
to her throat, pulled her into his car, and forced her to perform oral
sex on him as he drove to his sister's apartment, where he raped her
twice.' 9 Key claimed in his defense that the victim willingly came to
his sister's apartment and had consensual sex with him there.20
Key had prior convictions for assault with intent to commit rape,
indecent assault, and assault with a deadly weapon, involving three
separate victims.2' When Key raised his defense of consent, the victim
of one of his earlier assaults was allowed to testify about Key's crime
against her, which also involved a ruse, choking, threatening with a
knife, and forced oral sex.2
The appellate court reversed Key's conviction because of the ad-
mission of this evidence.23 The court stated: "The only effect of the
prior act evidence in this case is to allow it to bolster the witness'
credibility. While this would seem to be a socially acceptable purpose,
it does not comport with the applicable statutory and decisional
law." 24
[14. Id. at 315.]
[15. Id. at 312.]
[16. Id. at 315-16.]
[17. Id.]
18. 153 Cal. App. 3d 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
[19. Id. at 892.]
[20. Id. at 893.]
[21. Id.]
[22. Id.]
[23. Id. at 892.]
[24. Id. at 898.]
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To the average person, I think the results in these cases would
appear strange, if not outrageous. The type of legislative reform I will
be discussing would greatly reduce the likelihood of such cases in the
future. At this point, I will turn to the specifics of the proposed
reforms.
I. Ti PROPOSED RULES
The legislative proposal would add three new rules to the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The first of these, proposed Rule 413, would apply
to sexual assault cases. The basic rule of admissibility, set out in sub-
division (a) of the rule, reads as follows: "In a criminal case in which
the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of
the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of sexual
assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant."
Proposed Rule 414 states a parallel principle for criminal cases
involving child molestation: Evidence that the defendant committed
offenses of the same type on other occasions would be admissible.25
Proposed Rule 415 makes the same rules applicable in civil cases.26
Hence, for example, in a civil suit for damages by a rape victim, evi-
dence of the defendant's commission of rapes on other occasions
would be admissible.
All of the proposed rules include certain safeguards for the de-
fendant. The prosecutor-or the plaintiff in a civil case-would be
required to disclose the evidence of the uncharged offenses to the de-
fendant, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the sub-
stance of any testimony that is expected to be offered. 27 This prevents
unfair surprise and ensures that the defendant will have an opportu-
nity to prepare any response or rebuttal.
The following points should be noted concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of these rules:
First, the proposed rules of admissibility mean what they say. Ev-
idence admitted under the rules could be considered for its bearing on
any matter to which it is relevant. This includes questions of the de-
fendant's propensity or disposition to commit sex crimes. Evidence
Rule 404(b)'s prohibition of "character" evidence would be super-
seded in this context.
[25. FED. R. EvrD. 414(a).]
[26. FED. R. EvrD. 415(a).]
[27. FED. R. Evn. 413(b), 414(b), 415(b).]
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Second, these rules are rules of admissibility, and not mandatory
rules of admission. The general standards of the rules of evidence
would apply to evidence offered under these rules, including the limi-
tations of hearsay evidence, and the authority of the court to exclude
relevant evidence under Rule 403. However, the rules would elimi-
nate in sex offense cases the special restrictions on evidence of un-
charged acts, where the acts are crimes of the same type as the
charged offense. The analysis statement for the proposed Sexual As-
sault Prevention Act 28 explained the effect of this change as follows:
[E]vidence admissible pursuant to these rules would remain subject
to the normal authority of the court to exclude evidence pursuant to
F.R.E. 403 if the evidence's probative value is "substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice" or other adverse effects
noted in that rule.
It is not expected, however, that evidence admissible pursuant
to proposed Rules 413-15 would often be excluded on the basis of
Rule 403. Rather, the effect of the new rules is to put evidence of
uncharged offenses in sexual assault and child molestation cases on
the same footing as other types of evidence that are not subject to a
special exclusionary rule. The presumption is in favor of admission.
The underlying legislative judgment is that the sort of evidence that
is admissible pursuant to proposed Rules 413-15 is typically relevant
and probative, and that its probative value is normally not out-
weighed by any risk of prejudice or other adverse considerations.
29
Finally, the standard of proof with respect to uncharged offenses
under the new rules would be governed by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Huddleston v. United States.30 In Huddleston, the Supreme
Court held that information about uncharged offenses may be admit-
ted conditionally, and that such offenses may properly be considered
so long as a jury could reasonably conclude by a preponderance that
the offenses occurred.31 While the case was directly concerned with
admission under Rule 404(b), its reasoning on these points is also ap-
plicable to the proposed new rules for sex offense cases.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR THE PROPOSED RULES
The proposal of these rules presupposes that they will be more
effective than the current rules in promoting accurate fact-finding and
achieving just results. What are the policy considerations supporting
this view? Let's start with common sense.
28. H.R. 5960, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 3271, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
[29. Unpublished analysis statement.]
30. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
[31. Id at 688-91.]
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One obvious ground is considerations of probability. The defense
in a rape case will claim that the police or victim fingered the wrong
man, or that the victim consented and then made up a false charge, or
that the claim that a rape occurred is a complete fabrication. If the
direct evidence of guilt is not conclusive, there may be no adequate
basis for excluding these possibilities.
Evidence that the defendant has committed sexual assaults on
other occasions, however, often puts an entirely different light on the
matter. It would be quite a coincidence if a person who just happened
to be a chronic rapist was falsely or mistakenly implicated in a later
crime of the same type. In conjunction with the direct evidence of
guilt, knowledge of the defendant's past behavior may foreclose rea-
sonable doubt as to guilt in a case that would otherwise be
inconclusive.3 2
The second common sense ground for admitting and considering
this type of evidence is the ground that the existing rules most strongly
condemn-the inference concerning propensity or disposition. If we
put aside preconceptions for the moment, however, the inference is
certainly not an unreasonable one.
Ordinary people do not commit outrages against others because
they have relatively little inclination to do so, and because any inclina-
tion in that direction is suppressed by moral inhibitions and fear of the
practical risks associated with the commission of crimes. A person
with a history of rape or child molestation stands on a different foot-
ing. His past conduct provides evidence that he has the combination
of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the commission of
such crimes, that he lacks effective inhibitions against acting on these
impulses, and that the risks involved do not deter him. A charge of
rape or child molestation has greater plausibility against a person with
such a background.
In addition to these general grounds, the statements supporting
the legislative proposal have pointed to the strength of the public in-
terest in admitting all significant evidence of guilt in sex offense cases.
This reflects in part the typically secretive nature of such crimes, and
resulting lack of neutral witnesses in most cases; the difficulty of stop-
ping rapists and child molesters because of the reluctance of many
32. See generally 137 CoNo. REC S3240-41 (1991) (analysis statement accompanying S.
635); Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Admission of Criminal Histories at Trial,
22 U. MIci. J.L. REF. 707, 737-38, 738 n.64 (1989) [hereinafter Histories].
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victims to report the crime or testify; and the gravity of the danger to
the public if a rapist or child molester remains at large.
In cases involving adult victims, the issue of consent is a further
reason. In violent crimes other than sexual assaults, there is rarely
any colorable defense that the defendant's conduct was not criminal
because of consent by the victim. The accused mugger does not claim
that the victim freely handed over his wallet as a gift. In contrast,
claims are regularly heard in rape cases that the victim engaged in
consensual sex with the defendant and then falsely accused him. In
such instances, knowledge that the defendant has committed rapes on
other occasions is frequently critical in assessing the relative plausibil-
ity of these conflicting claims and accurately deciding cases that would
otherwise become unresolvable swearing matches.
In child molestation cases, the importance of admitting similar
crimes evidence is equally great, if not greater. Such cases regularly
present the need to rely on the testimony of child victim-witnesses
whose credibility can readily be attacked in the absence of substantial
corroboration. In this context, the public interest in admitting all sig-
nificant evidence that will illumine the credibility of the charge and
any denial by the defense is truly compelling.
What can be said on the other side of the issue? Let me start by
addressing the three standard justifications for restricting evidence of
uncharged acts.33
One ground is the need to provide fair notice to the defendant
concerning the matters he will have to respond to at trial? 4 The pro-
posed rules meet this concern by requiring full disclosure to the de-
fendant of the evidence that will be offered in support of the
uncharged offenses. This is more than the defendant would be enti-
tled to in connection with a formally charged offense.
The second standard rationale for limiting evidence of uncharged
acts is the need to establish reasonable limits on the scope of the pro-
ceedings.35 The concern here is diffusing the focus of the proceedings
and distracting the trier through prolonged explorations of the de-
fendant's personal history.
The proposed rules also incorporate features which are respon-
sive to this concern. They do not indiscriminately admit evidence of
all the bad things the defendant may have done in the course of his
[33. See generally Histories, supra note 32, at 727-33.]
[34. See id. at 727-28.]
[35. See id. at 727, 730.]
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life, but only admit evidence of criminal offenses of the same type as
those with which he is formally charged. This limits the number of
incidents for which evidence may be offered. In addition, the require-
ment of similarity in kind to the charged offense tends to ensure that
the uncharged acts will have a high degree of probative value, and will
not be mere distractions from the main issues.36
In some instances, the operation of the proposed rules will com-
plicate the proceedings. However, even if a large number of incidents
are brought in, the complexity will not exceed that of a trial in which
several counts are charged, or a large number of uncharged incidents
are brought in under existing rules.37 For example, in the Atlanta
child-murders case in 1982, the defendant Wayne Williams was for-
mally charged with two murders, but evidence linking him to ten other
killings was also presented.38 Similarly, if the defendant in a rape case
has passed through life leaving a trail of women who say that he raped
them, that fact is singular enough to justify the time required for
presenting it to the jury.39
The third standard rationale for the existing restriction is the con-
cern over prejudice.40 The claim here, of course, is not just that ad-
mission of evidence of uncharged offenses increases the probability of
conviction. That point is true, but admission of any other persuasive
evidence of guilt has the same effect.
Rather, the "prejudice" rationale maintains that this type of evi-
dence carries an unacceptable risk of convicting the innocent.4 1 This
is premised on the view that jurors are likely to accord prior offenses
more weight than they rationally merit as evidence of guilt, and are
likely to return unwarranted convictions based on antagonism against
the defendant that results from knowledge of his other offenses 4 2
36. See generally idi at 725-27, 737-38, 738 n.64 (1989); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDWSM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 2, 6 (1989) (in survey of 108,580 offenders,
offenders imprisoned for rape were 10.5 times more likely to be arrested for rape within three
years of release than offenders imprisoned for other offenses).
37. See, e.g., State v. Day, 715 P.2d 743 (Ariz. 1986) (upholding joinder and conviction on
fifty felony counts against thirteen victims, including seventeen counts of sexual assault).
38. See Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. 1983).
39. Cf. State v. DeBaere, 356 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1984) (admission of evidence of sexual
assaults against five other women within three year period); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I.
1980) (protestation of defendant to police that he did not know why women kept having consen-
sual sex with him and then falsely accusing him, following statement to victim that two other
women had made rape complaints against him).
[40. See Histories, supra note 32, at 727, 730-31.]
[41. See id. at 731-32.]
[42. See id at 730-31.]
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There is, however, no means of determining a priori whether par-
ticular categories of evidence are likely to be more prejudicial than
probative. The lesson must be learned from experience, and in the
context of sex offense prosecutions, the lesson of experience seems to
point in the other direction. Courts in the United States have tradi-
tionally been inclined to admit evidence of other sex crimes by the
defendant in sex offense prosecutions. 43 In some states, this has in-
volved the formal recognition of special case law rules of admissibility
in sex offense cases.4
Special rules of this sort have become less common in the past
few decades, in part because of the widespread adoption of codified
evidence rules that appear to leave no room for them. However, the
same practical result is often achieved by stretching the existing rules.
The contemporary edition of Wigrnore's Evidence45 has described this
tendency as follows:
[T]here is a strong tendency in prosecutions for sex offenses to ad-
mit evidence of the accused's sexual proclivities. Do such decisions
show that the general rule against the use of propensity evidence
against an accused is not honored in sex offense prosecutions? We
think so .... [S]ome states and courts have ... forthrightly and
expressly recogniz[ed] a "lustful disposition" or sexual proclivity ex-
ception to the general rule barring the use of character evidence
against an accused.... [Jjurisdictions that do not expressly recog-
nize a lustful disposition exception may effectively recognize such
an exception by expansively interpreting in prosecutions for sex of-
fenses various well-established exceptions to the character evidence
rule.46
Finally, the statements supporting the legislative proposal have
addressed two more specific objections.
The first of these is an alleged inconsistency with the rape victim
shield laws. American jurisdictions have generally adopted rules that
narrowly limit inquiry into unrelated sexual behavior of the alleged
victim in rape cases. 47 If the victim has immunity from disclosure of
what she has done in the past, the argument runs, then why should the
defendant be taxed with his past misconduct?
However, this objection is superficial. The shield laws further
two important policies: First, they promote cooperation in the prose-
[43. See infra notes 45, 46, 75 and accompanying text.]
[44. See id.]
45. 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62.2 (Tillers rev.
ed. 1983).
[46. Id. at 1334-36.]
[47. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 412.]
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cution of sex offenses by not requiring the victim to suffer exposure of
her sexual history as the price for doing so. Second, they safeguard
the privacy of rape victims. There are no comparable policies sup-
porting non-disclosure of the defendant's acts. The defendant's coop-
eration is not required for prosecution. Violent sex crimes are not
private acts, and the defendant can claim no privacy interest in sup-
pressing them when they are relevant to the determination of a later
criminal charge.
In addition, there is a distinction in terms of probative value. The
complainant in a rape prosecution is usually just a woman who had
the bad luck to be raped. Inquiry into her sexual history will normally
disclose nothing that particularly distinguishes her from the general
population, and typically has little probative value on the question
whether she consented to sex in the charged incident and fabricated a
false accusation.
In contrast, evidence showing that the defendant has committed
sexual assaults on other occasions places him in a small class of de-
praved criminals, and is likely to be highly probative in relation to the
pending charge. The difference in typical probative value alone is suf-
ficient to refute facile equations between evidence of other sexual be-
havior by the victim and evidence of other violent sex crimes by the
defendant.
The second specific objection to the proposal is that it is too
broad because it allows evidence of uncharged offenses for which the
defendant has never been prosecuted, as well as evidence of prior con-
victions for sex crimes. One response is that the approach of the pro-
posed new rules is no different in this respect than current Rule
404(b). The admission of evidence under the current rule is not con-
ditioned on a prior conviction or other prior determination that the
defendant committed the uncharged offenses.08 The following addi-
tional points may be noted in response to this criticism:
First, there is no disadvantage to the defendant if he is only for-
mally charged with a particular offense, and other (uncharged) of-
fenses are offered as supporting evidence. The defendant has the
same rights and opportunities to respond to evidence of uncharged
offenses that he has in relation to a formally charged offense, includ-
ing the assistance of counsel, cross-examination of witnesses, and pres-
entation of rebuttal evidence. In addition, under the proposed new
rules, the prosecutor would be required to make a full disclosure to
48. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
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the defendant of the evidence to be offered to establish an uncharged
offense. 49 Hence, the defendant's procedural rights under the pro-
posed rules exceed those which he would have if he were formally
charged with all offenses.
Second, rapists and child molesters frequently commit numerous
crimes before being apprehended and prosecuted, and it is often im-
possible to join all offenses for trial in a single forum. This occurs, for
example, in the case of a rapist or child molester who commits crimes
in a number of different states, or who commits some crimes in state
jurisdiction and others in federal jurisdiction. If the jury is to be made
aware of all relevant criminal conduct of the defendant, this can only
be accomplished in such a case through the admission of evidence of
uncharged crimes.
Third, it also commonly happens in rape and child molestation
cases that the victim is too traumatized, intimidated, or humiliated to
file a complaint and go through the full course of proceedings in a
criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, the victims in such cases are often
willing to bear the more limited burden of testifying at the offender's
trial for raping or molesting another person, when they find out that
the person who marred their lives has also victimized others. Barring
such testimony whenever the victims cannot take the stress of going
through a full prosecution would enable rapists and child molesters to
benefit from their success in traumatizing the victims of their crimes.
Fourth, evidence which links the defendant to several other rapes
or child molestations may be highly probative when taken in the ag-
gregate, even if it does not warrant charging separate counts based on
all the individual incidents. As the Supreme Court observed in the
Huddleston case, "individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in them-
selves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an
evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent
parts." 50
Fifth, the fact that the evidence supporting uncharged offenses
may fall short of establishing their occurrence beyond a reasonable
doubt is not a valid basis for barring the admission and consideration
of such evidence. A defendant's commission of an offense with which
he is formally charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
because we are unwilling to pronounce a person guilty of a crime-
[49. FED. R. Evm. 413(b), 414(b), 415(b).]




and to subject him to criminal punishment-unless guilt is established
with a high degree of certainty. This does not mean, however, that the
truth or validity of any particular piece of supporting evidence must
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this respect, evidence admitted under the proposed new rules
for sex offense cases would be assessed in essentially the same way as
evidence of uncharged offenses that is admitted under current Rule
404(b). The defendant cannot be convicted for these offenses; they
are admitted only for their bearing on the defendant's commission of
the formally charged offense. If there are weaknesses in the govern-
ment's evidence supporting the uncharged offenses, then the jury will
be less persuaded of their occurrence, and their probative value as
evidence of the charged offense is reduced accordingly. However, the
strength of the supporting evidence generally goes to probative value
rather than to admissibility. Evidence of this type is properly consid-
ered so long as the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant
committed the uncharged offense. No preliminary finding that the de-
fendant committed the uncharged offense is required before evidence
of the offense can be admitted, much less a finding that it occurred
beyond a reasonable doubt.
51
III. EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED Acrs GENERALLY
At this point I'm going to step back from the pending legislative
proposal, and talk more broadly about the rules governing the admis-
sion of evidence of uncharged acts.
When I make my own assessment of evidentiary rules, I start by
asking myself what information a reasonable person would want to
have in deciding an important matter. If I conclude that a reasonable
person would want to have information that is excluded by existing
evidentiary rules, I then ask whether there is a sufficient basis for de-
nying juries evidence that one would reasonably desire to make an
informed decision.
The answer to the first question is not hard in connection with
similar crimes evidence. If I were responsible for deciding whether a
person had committed a crime or engaged in other misconduct, I
would reasonably want to know about his prior conduct in like mat-
ters. As noted earlier, this type of information often has a lot to say
about the individual's dispositions and inclinations, about the pres-
51. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681.
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ence or absence of effective inhibitions against engaging in serious vi-
olence or other criminality, about his willingness to hazard the
practical risks of criminal conduct, and about the probability or im-
probability that he has been falsely or mistakenly implicated.
Nevertheless, the existing evidentiary rules embody an irrebut-
table presumption that the ordinary people who serve on juries will
behave unreasonably, if they are allowed to have this type of informa-
tion and to accord it its natural probative value. The basis of this pre-
sumption is the idea that jurors will ineluctably overestimate this type
of evidence, or be inflamed by it to convict the defendant merely be-
cause he is a "bad person." This idea is said to be a venerable piece of
ancestral wisdom which has been passed down for centuries in the
common law tradition. Thus, Wigmore's Evidence52 offers the follow-
ing assessment:
It may almost be said that it is because of the indubitable relevancy
of specific bad acts showing the character of the accused that such
evidence is excluded. It is objectionable not because it has no ap-
preciable probative value but because it has too much. The natural
and inevitable tendency of the tribunal . . . is to give excessive
weight to the vicious record of crime .... [Flor nearly three centu-
ries, ever since the liberal reaction that began with the restoration
of the Stuarts, this policy of exclusion ... has received judicial sanc-
tion, which has become more emphatic with time and experience.53
So says the treatise. But is it true? I would say that it is at least
misleading. It overlooks a number of important contrary trends, and
more broadly, I think, it misses the forest for the trees.
Let's start at the beginning. The rules excluding evidence of un-
charged acts initially emerged in the late seventeenth century.54 The
early decisions, however, do not exclude this type of evidence on the
ground that it is prejudicial. Rather, they reflect the "fair notice" con-
cern, and the need for some limit on the scope of the proceedings.
55
The seminal cases56 do not point to a body of experience showing
that evidence of prior crimes is likely to be overestimated by jurors, or
that it is likely to result in unwarranted convictions based on antago-
nism. The "prejudice" idea may have originated as a rationalization
for an established rule that arose for different reasons.
52. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 58.2.
[53. Id. at 1212-13.1
[54. See Histories, supra note 32, at 716-17.]
55. See WioMoRE, supra note 45, § 58.2 nn.1-2 (citing Hampden's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 1053,




By the eighteenth century the exclusionary principle was no
longer novel. Various sources from that period state that evidence of
character or uncharged acts is not admissible, subject to narrow excep-
tions.5 7 However, the rule did not have the same practical significance
that it has today. In a period when most trials were conducted before
local juries in small communities, the likelihood was greater that ju-
rors would have their own information about what the defendant had
done in the past.
The debates over the ratification of the Constitution illustrate this
point. Objections were raised that the Constitution required criminal
jury trials within the same state, but did not perpetuate the "same
vicinage" requirement. 58 In the Virginia ratification convention, Pat-
rick Henry stated:
Will gentlemen tell me the trial by a jury of the vicinage where the
party resides is preserved? ... [T]hs state ... is so large that your
juries may be collected five hundred miles from where the party
resides-no neighbors who are acquainted with their characters,
their good or bad conduct in life, to judge of the unfortunate man
.... By the bill of rights of England, a subject has a right to a trial
by his peers. What is meant by his peers? Those who reside near
him, his neighbors, and who are well acquainted with his character
and situation in life. Is this secured in the proposed plan before
you? No, sir.59
The objections raised at the ratification conventions were pri-
marily from the standpoint of a defendant who would be denied the
jurors' independent knowledge of his good character. However, the
same point could obviously work in the opposite direction. If a jury of
the defendant's "neighbors" independently knew of the defendant's
bad character or acts, that could work against him.
The likelihood of such knowledge by jurors presumably de-
creased in many areas with urbanization and the growth of population
in the nineteenth century. At this point in time, however, other means
of admitting evidence of uncharged acts opened up. The early nine-
teenth century brought formal recognition to a wide range of now-
familiar exception categories. 6° The Supreme Court has offered the
following assessment of this development:
57. See Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evidenced
in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CN. L. REv. 713, 717-18 nn.19-20 (1981).
[58. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.]
59. III JONATHAN ELLIOT, EIOT's DEBATES 578-79 (1836); see II id. at 109-10 (similar
point by participant in Massachusetts convention).
[60. See Histories, supra note 32, at 717.]
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Alongside the general principle that prior convictions are inadmissi-
ble, despite their relevance to guilt.., the common law developed
broad, vaguely defined exceptions-such as proof of intent, identity,
malice, motive, and plan-whose application is left largely to the
discretion of the trial judge .... In short, the common law...
implicitly recognized that any unfairness resulting from admitting
prior convictions was more often than not balanced by its probative
value and permitted the prosecution to introduce such evidence
without demanding any particularly strong justification.61
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought new
doctrines which broadened further the grounds of admission. The
common law rule had barred testimony by persons convicted of felo-
nies and crimes involving dishonesty.62 This was softened into a rule
which allowed such persons to testify, but admitted their convictions
for impeachment.63 Once the defendant's testimonial incapacity was
removed by statutes enacted in the late nineteenth century, it became
possible to treat the defendant like other witnesses, and to disclose his
conviction record if he testified.
The most common version of this rule automatically admitted a
witness's convictions for felonies and crimina falsi.64 Hence, when the
defendant took the stand, the jury would learn of his entire record of
convictions for serious crimes.
Another avenue of admission was created by recidivist sentencing
statutes. Until the 1960's, the most common formulation of these stat-
utes involved specifying the defendant's past convictions in the indict-
ment. The jury would be instructed not to pay attention to the priors
in determining guilt or innocence, but what's known is known. Under
the procedures of these statutes, jurors could be aware of prior of-
fenses of the defendant during the trial, and their assessment of the
evidence was presumably colored by that knowledge. 65
Finally, there are aspects of procedural and substantive criminal
law whose practical effect is much like that of admitting evidence of
61. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438-39 n.6 (1983).
[62. See Histories, supra note 32, at 722-23.]
[63. See id.]
64. See Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176-77
(1940); Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78
HARV. L. REV. 426, 441 (1964); see also HARRY KALVEN JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 147 (1966) (in cases where defendant had criminal record, jury was aware of record in 59%
of cases, including 72% of cases in which defendant testified and 13% of cases in which defend-
ant did not testify).
65. See generally Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40
N.Y.U. L. REv. 332 (1965); Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Crim-
inal Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210 (1958).
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uncharged acts. These rules depart from the atomistic approach of
charging offenses based on discrete incidents taken in isolation, and
give the trier information about broader patterns of criminal behavior
of which the particular incident is a part.
One obvious example is joinder rules. Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 8(a), offenses can be joined in a single trial if they
are "of the same or similar character," if they are based on the same
act or transaction, or if they are based on acts or transactions which
are connected or part of a common scheme or plan. Other examples
include conspiracy prosecutions involving a number of criminal acts
by the conspirators, and criminal enterprise offenses, such as RICO
66
and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise drug offense.67 Much of the
value for prosecutors of using these offenses is essentially the same as
that of charging a particular offense and bringing in evidence of un-
charged acts as supporting evidence: It permits the introduction of
evidence concerning a pattern or series of crimes, whose cumulative
effect may be "greater than its constituent parts."68
At this point I can give more definite content to my earlier re-
mark about "missing the forest for the trees." There have been re-
strictions on evidence of uncharged acts since the late seventeenth
century.69 However, the range, ingenuity, and breadth of the avenues
that the system has devised for circumventing these restrictions is at
least equally striking. The history is one of on-going tension between
an early-established rule against admitting this type of evidence, and
the desire to admit it anyway because of its obvious relevance and
probative value in many circumstances. The result has been rules
which instruct the jurors to pretend that they know nothing about a
defendant's criminal propensities, but which ensure that jurors often
have information whose probative value on this point is manifest.
Against this background, the special rules that have been recog-
nized for sex offense cases in some jurisdictions are not that unique.
The distinction is more that the need to allow evidence of propensity
has appeared to be particularly exigent in this area, and deci-
sionmakers have tended to be more straightforward than in other ar-
eas about what they were doing.
On the legislative side, many states adopted so-called "sexual
psychopath" laws, which established special procedures for the civil
[66. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations offense, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-63.]
[67. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)-(c).]
68. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).
[69. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.]
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commitment of sex offenders. 70 This potentially provides a way
around the rule against propensity evidence through proceedings in
which the defendant's dangerousness is directly in issue. The Illinois
commitment procedure for "sexually dangerous persons," 71 whose
constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court in Allen v. Illi-
nois72 in 1986, illustrates the point. Under that procedure, a mentally
disordered person can be committed for purposes of treatment and
protection of the public if it is shown that he has "criminal propensi-
ties to the commission of sex offenses" and "demonstrated propensi-
ties toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of
children. '73 In establishing the required propensity, the government
may introduce "evidence of the commission by the respondent of any
number of crimes. '74
The judicial response has already been noted: Courts in some
states have adopted special rules allowing evidence of similar crimes
in sex offense cases, 75 and there has been a strong tendency to apply
the standard exception categories with unusual liberality in such cases.
In the contemporary period, the adoption in most states of codi-
fied evidence rules barring "character evidence" has created new bar-
riers to admitting evidence that is reasonably required for an informed
decision in sex offense cases. The hostility of many legal writers to
special treatment of sex offense cases, and the general shift of case law
in favor of defense interests since the 1960's, have also presumably
taken their toll. Nevertheless, the impetus to admit this type of evi-
dence has not abated in the contemporary period, and the decisions
continue to reflect the resulting tension with the general rule of
exclusion.
I will give three illustrations:
[70. See Comment, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act: An Examination of a Stat-
ute in Need of Change, 12 So. ILL U. L.J. 437, 437 (1988).]
[71. IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725 §§ 205/0.01-12.]
72. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
[73. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725 § 205/1.01.]
[74. Id. § 205/5.]
75. See, e.g., Bracey v. United States, 142 F.2d 85, 88-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S.
762 (1944); State v. Spence, 704 P.2d 272 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Farmer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 235
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Benefiel v. State, 578 N.E.2d 338, 346 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2971 (1992); State v. Allen, 183 P.2d 458, 460 (Kan. 1947); State v. Bisagno, 246 P. 1001 (Kan.
1926); Abbott v. State, 204 N.W. 74, rev'd, 206 N.W. 153 (Neb. 1925); State v. Reineke, 106 N.E.
52, 54-55 (Ohio 1914); State v. Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 131-33 (W. Va. 1990); see also State v.
Tarrell, 247 N.W.2d 696, 702-03 (Wis. 1976) (evidence demonstrating defendant's "propensity to




The first is the case of State v. Fears.76 The defendant in that case
raped the victim of the charged offense when he picked her up while
she was hitchhiking. 77 The evidence in the case included testimony by
a 15-year-old witness that the defendant had also raped her two days
prior to the charged incident, after offering her a ride at a bus stop.7
8
The defendant conceded that he had sexual intercourse with the vic-
tim but claimed it was consensual. 79
In reviewing the case, the court of appeals stated that state evi-
dence rule 404 must be "applied strictly in cases of sexual crimes be-
cause of the inflammatory nature of prior sexual crimes evidence." 80
Nevertheless, the court upheld the admission of the evidence on the
ground that the defendant "essentially contend[ed] that he did not in-
tend forcibly to compel the victim to have sexual intercourse." 81 In so
many words, the court held that evidence of other non-consensual sex
crimes is admissible to show the defendant's intent to get sex without
consent.
This case is typical of many that admit evidence of other offenses
in response to the defendant's claim of consent. There is no claim that
the defendant engaged in unintentional touching of a sexual nature, or
misunderstood the victim's attitude. Rather, the court is presented
with unequivocally different versions of the incident. The defendant
claims that it was a romantic interlude. The victim says that she was
raped. The evidence of other sexually assaultive behavior by the de-
fendant is admitted because it makes the victim's version more prob-
able and the defendant's less so.
In cases of this type, creative use of the "intent" exception and
other categories has enabled some courts to approximate a broad rule
of admissibility for evidence of other similar crimes.82 However, there
are also many comparable cases involving claims of consent in which
76. 688 P.2d 88 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).




[81. Id at 90.]
82. See, e.g., Oglen v. State, 440 So.2d 1172, 1176 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 440 So.2d
1177 (Ala. 1983); O'Neal v. State, 318 S.E.2d 66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); State v. DeBaere, 356
N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1984); State v. McRae, 371 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Rubio v. State,
607 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 882 (1986); Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1982).
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courts have concluded that the existing rules bar evidence of un-
charged offenses.8 3
My second example is a child molestation case. Consent is not a
defense in these cases, but they generate pressures of other sorts. The
problem of proof that results from the need to rely on child victim-
witnesses has already been noted. Prior offenses of this type by the
defendant show an unusual disposition-a sexual or sado-sexual inter-
est in children-that does not exist in ordinary people. In the com-
mon situation where the victim is the daughter or step-daughter of the
defendant, there is often testimony by the victim's sisters that the de-
fendant has also molested them. The trier has an incomplete picture
of the situation if it is denied the evidence that the defendant has been
using his children as his harem.
In Elliott v. State,84 the Supreme Court of Wyoming apparently
achieved a global resolution of the problem of admission in child mo-
lestation cases by use of the "motive" exception in state evidence rule
404(b). In the prosecution of a man for raping his nine-year-old step-
daughter, the court held that evidence of uncharged sexual assaults by
the defendant on the victim's sister was admissible as proof of mo-
tive.85 In support of this conclusion, it cited definitions of "motive"
which included "that which leads the mind to indulge in a criminal
act"86 and "something within a person (as a need, idea, organic state,
or emotion) that incites him to action." s The court stated:
[W]e have . .. a victim whose testimony is corroborated by fresh
complaint and some apparent injury .... The defendant testified
that no such conduct occurred, and ascribed a motive to the victim
for testifying falsely. Given this evidentiary conflict a finder of fact
would be extremely interested in other information that might be
available to help resolve the ultimate issue. Evidence of motive
would be such information. One ... whose preference or addiction
for unusual sexual practices occurs in the form of pedophilia, could
well be recognized as having a motive to commit the acts com-
plained of by the victim. The fact finder could infer from the acts
complained of by the older sister that Elliott was so motivated.88
83. See, e.g., Velez v. State, 762 P.2d 1297 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); People v. Key, 153 Cal.
App. 3d 888 (1984); State v. Pace, 275 S.E.2d 254 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Saltarelli, 655
P.2d 697 (Wash. 1982); see also State v. Hansen, 608 P.2d 1083 (Mont. 1980) (exclusion of evi-
dence of prior offense in relation to claim of fabrication).
84. 600 P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979).
[85. lId at 1045-49.]
[86. ld at 1048 (quoting Thompson v. United States, 144 F. 14, 18 (1906)).]
[87. Id (quoting WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1475
(1961)).]
[88. Id. at 1048-49.]
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This appears to be the practical equivalent of a rule of admissibil-
ity for propensity evidence, where the propensity in question is a dis-
position to engage in child molestation.89 However, child molestation
cases can be found in other jurisdictions in which courts have excluded
this type of evidence.90
My final illustration concerns the class of cases in which the
charged offense and the uncharged acts were committed against the
same victim. A special rule admitting evidence of sexual disposition
was widely recognized for these cases in traditional case law.91 Cur-
rently, courts are still disposed to find, on one rationale or another,
that evidence of the defendant's sexual inclinations towards the partic-
ular victim is admissible, notwithstanding the general rule against evi-
dence of "character" or "propensity." 92
In this area as well, some courts have cut the Gordian knot. In
State v. McKay,93 the Supreme Court of Oregon apparently adopted a
rule that evidence of this type is always potentially admissible.94 The
defendant was charged with sexually abusing his stepdaughter when
she was 15, and the victim testified about earlier sexual contacts when
she was between the ages of 10 and 13.95 The court's rationale was
that evidence of a disposition towards the particular victim is outside
the scope of Rule 404's prohibition of evidence of character:
Simply stated, the proffered evidence here was admissible to
demonstrate the sexual predisposition this defendant had for this
particular victim, that is, to show the sexual inclination of [the] de-
fendant towards the victim, not that he had a character trait or pro-
pensity to engage in sexual misconduct generally. 96
89. For examples of other recent decisions taking a broad approach to admission in child
molestation cases, on various rationales, see, e.g., State v. Crane, 799 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1990); Beasley v. State, 518 So.2d 917 (Fla. 1988); Potts v. State, 427 So.2d 822 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Cooper v. State, 325 S.E.2d 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Andrews v. State, 529
N.E.2d 360, 365-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 919 (1989); State v. Lachterman,
812 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992); State v. Long, 726 P.2d
1364, 1365-68 (Mont. 1986); State v. Plymate, 345 N.W.2d 327 (Neb. 1984); State v. Raye, 326
S.E.2d 333 (N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 332 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1985); State v. Champagne, 422
N.W.2d 840 (S.D. 1988); State v. Friedrich, 398 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1987).
90. See, eg., People v. McMillan, 407 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980); Wells v. State, 799
P.2d 1128 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); HaIl v. State, 615 P.2d 1020 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
[91. See Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evi-
dence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 127, 168-81 (1993).]
92. See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 470 N.E.2d 1121, 1128 (I11. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Spauld-
ing, 313 N.W.2d 878,880-81 (Iowa 1981); State v. Moore, 748 P.2d 833, 837-38 (Kan. 1987); Vogel
v. State, 554 A.2d 1231 (Md. 1989); State v. Graham, 641 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (Mo. 1982); State v.
T.W., 715 P.2d 428 (Mont. 1986).
93. 787 P.2d 479 (Or. 1990).
[94. See id. at 480.]
[95. Id. at 479.]
[96. Id. at 480.1
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However, this view of Rule 404 is not shared by all courts, and
cases can be found in which courts have excluded evidence of other
sexual assaults against the same victim on the basis of the no-propen-
sity-evidence rule.97
In closing, I would suggest that the current rules are subject to
criticism on two grounds. First, they are inadequate in providing the
trier with information that is reasonably necessary to achieve just re-
sults in sex offense prosecutions, and hence inadequate to protect peo-
ple from a particularly dangerous class of criminals. Now as in the
past, many courts attempt to get around the restrictions, but there is
no reliability in the results of this effort. The evidence that is needed
to establish the guilt of rapists and child molesters is often subject to
exclusion.
The result is cases in which everyone who is fully informed about
the case-the police, the prosecutor, the victim, the judge, the defend-
ant's lawyer, even spectators in the courtroom-is persuaded that the
defendant did it, because the combination of the direct evidence and
knowledge of the defendant's past conduct forecloses any genuine
doubt on that point. Only the people who are actually responsible for
deciding the case are denied the critical information.
The second criticism is the resulting distortions in the law. The
vagueness of the standards of Rule 404(b) ensures considerable varia-
tion in their application by the courts, and this tendency is magnified
in sex offense cases by the special pressures courts have felt to find
some way of getting the evidence in. People's security against sexual
violence should not have to depend on the willingness of courts to
stretch evidentiary rules in particular cases.
The legislative proposal I have discussed provides a reasonable
and honest alternative. It permits the use of evidence of other sex
crimes in sex offense cases, while providing appropriate safeguards of
fairness for the defendant. No fictions of limited admissibility are re-
lied on; evidence admitted under the new rules would be subject to
rational assessment. The result would be a major step forward in
achieving justice and protecting people from one of the most atrocious
forms of criminal violence.
97. See, e.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988); People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y.
1987).
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